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1. ABSTRACT  
 
This research deals with corporate social responsibility and its association 
with firms’ earnings management in Greek listed companies. Testing on a large 
sample of greek listed firms, we ended up that there is a notably negative 
correlation between corporate social responsibility and earnings management, 
specifically when rational managers rule a firm because they are not direct 
interested parties. On the other hand, we realize that there is a strong association 
with CSR and earnings Management when stakeholders are governing a company. 
Existing literature indicates that a company’s ownership structure influences the 
way CSR and earning management interact with each other.  In general, our results 
are in favor of the hypothesis that all companies, independently of its structure or 
its domination, present their results in an ethical and transparent way.  
 
Keywords Earnings management; Corporate social responsibility; Investor 
protection; transparent financial reporting; discretionary accruals; Greek listed 
companies 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Earnings Management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies so 
as to achieve specific objective.” (Scott 2003, p. 369) Nonetheless, the definition of 
earnings management is that it occurs when managers use judgement in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports either to mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company 
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999, p.368) There is a great controversy regarding to earnings 
management and its utility in the procedure of the presentation of the financial 
statements of a firm. According to the Journal of Accounting and Economics (Vol. 
42, issue 3, Dec. 2003) some managers using unethical methods are trying to avoid 
the reporting of annual losses or to encrypt valuable information. The opposite side 
argues that these practices are being used in order to disrupt the clarity of the 
financial information. Opinions, which are in the middle of the above mentioned, 
state that earnings management is a “tool” which helps whoever uses it, in a way 
that is efficient or not. The way it will be used depends mostly in the economic 
situation of the company but in its structure, too. 
 
Many studies have agreed to the beneficial ability of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) to a firm and extensively in our lives. The recent years, more and 
more companies expand the allocation of its recourses to practices classified as 
Corporate Social Responsibility. Regarding to firms, by investing in CSR they are 
capable of building a positive reputation and as a result having royal customers. CSR 
also contributes to the recruitment of new staff; boost employee loyalty and to 
achieve an organizational growth. These organizations are trying to find a different 
way to strive for the modern corporation and they differed in their ‘governance 
form’. In comparison with a non – CSR company, these firms care about the 
environment and account for their social impact, looking for appropriate 
management and reporting. (Ioannou and Serafeim 2014) Furthermore, companies 
can turn it into a competitive benefit, because they can reduce the firm’s waste in 
order to be an environmental-healthy company and as a result to save more money. 
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The most analysts concentrated on the costs, which stem from a CSR commitment. 
Lect. Diana Corina Gligor – Cimpoieru Ph. D tried to approach these costs in a 
strategical way and ended up that the implementation of CSR requires the firm value 
maximization simultaneously with the added value of the stakeholders. Opponents 
of CSR practice do not find an association with socially responsible activities and the 
profit of the company, so they believe that it is unnecessary to invest in these.     
 
In this research, we analyze in what extent CSR activities towards Greek listed 
companies are considered an attempt with a view to reduce earnings management 
and simultaneously strengthen information transparency. Evidence from prior 
research supports that CSR contributes to earnings management in the way the 
financial reports are presented. These firms are likely to be more sceptic by the time 
they make accounting and operating decisions, while they are in line with the 
‘transparent financial reporting’ hypothesis. (Kim et al. 2012) This association is not 
always sincere because managers who attempt to cover their diplomatic actions can 
corrupt CSR. (Prior et al. 2008) In order to conclude about this association between 
earnings management and corporate social responsibility in Greece, we take into 
account an inclusive approach. By testing for every firm the environmental damage 
levels for which is responsible, the credit risk, the size considering the total assets, 
as well as its enterprise value, we are trying to combine – compare them in order to 
understand the influence of CSR.  Moreover, the above studies and many more in 
which I have not been referred to, strongly claim that there is a strong connection 
between CSR and earnings management, nonetheless, straightforward proof of an 
empirical relationship is still under research. 
 
In this analysis, we measure the effect of CSR in earnings management in 
Greece. For this reason, we based our research on the Truecost environmental score, 
which shows the companies with CSR activities and the level of these. We take into 
consideration two similar cases measuring earnings management with discretionary 
accruals. All data are provided by the Amadeus database, while Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) confirm to us that all these companies are trading. We are going to 
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use a sample of 68 Greek listed firms, for a five - year period, 2012 until 2016.  We 
find that CSR is obviously becoming more prevalent in the Greek spotlight of 
companies and it has started to influence earnings management.  
 
The Anglo-Saxon economic model is predominant in UK and USA and we are 
able to find many articles and papers, which deal with the association of CSR and 
earnings management. Regarding to stock markets like the Greek one, there is 
limited literature. (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 2007). What makes it worth to 
examine the Greek market case, is that it is an one of a kind about the integration 
of CSR activities on its earnings management system because these practices were 
not known until recently and they are coming from foreign - different economic 
systems. According to a research made by Aravossis & Panayiotou in year 2008, 
there were 28 companies with CSR reports, which were listed in Athens Stock 
Exchange. Nowadays, this number has tripled and we are capable of having more 
accurate results about the volume of these activities. Our analysis offers a lot to the 
current literature concerning earnings management. Firstly, even though a few 
researches have been carried out, which concern primarily US and UK data about 
the correlation between CSR and earnings management, as far as we know, there 
is not any report in Greece that analyzes this topic. This means that our outcome 
will benefit the growth of knowledge concerning this issue and it will increase the 
empirical data about this influence in the case of a micro - market like Greece. 
Secondly, our results could give insight to associates with valuable knowledge about 
earnings management. Finally yet importantly, this research could be useful to 
everyone who deal with financial decisions since it examines a rising issue of 
financial reporting along with CSR practices. 
 
The rest of this research is composed as follows. Firstly, we shortly refer to 
the literature as well as to the hypothesis development. Then the research model 
follows along with the empirical results. At the final stage, we analyze our complete 
conclusions and the limitations of this study. 
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2.1. Literature Review  
 
Concerning to the literature on the connection between CSR and earnings 
management, there are inadequate researches and the results differ depending on 
the case. Many studies which investigate this association between CSR and financial 
reporting practice, firstly based on the strategic incentive of CSR inside an 
organization. Earnings management is best described as the actions of management 
with a view to depreciate the value of the financial statements (Kinney Jnr, Palmrose 
& Scholz 2004). According to Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) it is more possible to 
detect earnings management in the case that the manager handles with prudence 
the accounting numbers. Moreover, the belief of managers is that the only case in 
order to envolve in earnings management is the case of not completely adapting the 
accounting numbers to extract the effect of earnings management. The quality of 
revenue is reduced along with the ability to forecast future income and cash flows 
(Lev 2003). The most of the time, investors have been misguided due to earnings 
management and this is not acknowledged as ethical (Kaplan 2001).  
 
According to Lev et al. (2010) companies will not extensively finance 
corporate social programs unless this adds financial worth. A research carried out 
by Prior et al. (2008) examines the possibility that firms incorporate CSR with a view 
to influence earnings management. Concerning to monitored firms, their findings 
indicate a beneficial association between earnings management and CSR; on the 
other part, this outcome is not valid for unmonitored firms. This happens because 
the unmonitored firms present immaterial results composing greater than 80 
percent of the sampling and making their documentation less effective.  
 
In contrast with the unformentioned studies, Kim et al (2012) targets to the 
moral concerns of an organization, which is a different version about the influence 
of CSR in financial reporting. Unlike with the others, Kim et al (2012) investigates 
unmonitored firms supplying us with a common clue about the association between 
CSR and financial reporting activities, which are restricted, only in U.S.A.  Chih et al. 
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(2008) used global evidence (1.653 corporations in 46 countries) in order to analyze 
CSR and earnings management having as a result the conflicting results depending 
on the framework. They found out that there are three types of earnings 
management: “earnings smoothing, earnings aggressiveness and earnings losses 
and decreases avoidance.” The impact of CSR in earnings management depends on 
the type that the companies incorporate. When the companies focus on CSR 
activities the degree of “earnings smoothing” diminishes along with “earnings losses 
and decreases avoidance” and in contrast with “earnings aggressiveness” which 
arises.  
 
Regarding earnings management and the impact in the owners of a firm, the 
truth is that it affects stakeholders too. Stakeholders have invested in firms and they 
are  recognized as a group that “bear some form of risk as a result of having invested 
some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm” (Clarkson, 
1995). The meaning of this is that manager’s actions in our case earnings 
management, which misdirect the stakeholders of the true value of company’s 
economic position, have a great impact for all the parts of the company and in 
society in general (Zahra et al., 2005). In the case that the shareholders become 
aware of earnings management, the company’s stock market value falls down at 
once (Dechow and Sweeney, 1996). Similarly, bonds will their financial worth and 
by extension, bondholders’ revenue will decrease. Additionally, banks will face 
problems regarding the return of the lending money because they have relied on 
inflated income predictions (DeFond and Jiambalbo, 1994). The employees are 
influenced by these earnings management’s techniques, too. Depending on the 
country, there are different mechanisms in order to protect investors as well as 
different legislation concerning CSR (Reinhardt et al. 2008). The decisions in the 
United States corporations are made by its board of directors, or by administrators. 
This happens with a view to establish a regime of transparency inside the companies 
and to make sure that the senior executives or the stakeholders do not act for their 
own benefit. 
 
The research of D’Souza et al. (2000) investigates the alliance between 
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earnings management and costs of labor and discovered that people who run the 
businesses try to decrease the labor cost per union during the report of earnings 
and the agreements. In this way, they manage to diminish the total labor costs of 
the company. Finally, an important point of Zahra et al is that when numbers are 
reported, they should present the real economic situation of a company, because if 
they are misrepresented the firm will lose its purity in markets and in society in 
general.  
 
Because of the uncertain evidence from previous surveys concerning to the 
association of CSR and earnings management, it is not easy to come to clear 
conclusions about the essence of this connection. Nonetheless, Francis et al. (2008) 
investigates the connection between the voluntary and supplementary financial 
disclosure and earnings management. A self-made disclosure statement and a 
sample of 677 United States companies were used and they concluded in a 
supplementary relationship between the quality of earnings and voluntary financial 
publication, e.g. the greater quality earnings are these of firms with more voluntary 
disclosures– or, otherwise, decreased earnings management. Additionally, Han et 
al. (2010) find that the avoidance of doubtfulness and the individuality of global 
culture driving us to the conclusion that the association between these two 
elements varies accordingly to the degree of investor security. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
 
CSR has not an official definition, although Carroll’s (1979, 1991) interpretation 
is the one that is widely known, as well as accepted: “The social responsibility of 
business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations 
that society has of organizations at a given point in time.” Garriga and Mele´ (2004) 
have distinguished CSR into four groups: (1) economic responsibilities, (2) legal 
responsibilities, (3) ethical responsibilities and (4) philanthropic responsibilities.  
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 Many studies have been done concerning CSR and earnings management, one 
of them is the research of Gargouri et al. (2010), but most of them have failed to come 
to a valid conclusion due to lack of data. The nature of the data is another factor that 
makes it difficult because of the hard transformation of discretionary accruals. Ethical 
theories have connected CSR with the social responsibility of a firm. Specifically, this 
alliance is believed that improves firm’s financial performance, decreases operating 
costs and overall boosts profits. A research made by Adam Smith (2012) focuses on 
the integration of the ethical side of CSR with its practical side, specifically the 
managerial one of the stakeholder theory (Mele 2009, Parmar et al. 2010). Moreover, 
an evolution has been done in order to engage CSR with stakeholders’ theories, which 
is based on financial and ethical statements. As an example, Phillips (2003) proposed 
the concept of ‘‘stakeholder legitimacy’’ and proposed the circumstances under which 
the stakeholders have authority into the organization.  
 
Stepping into political theories, it is suggested that wherever the company is 
established, it should take care of the society and try to find out ways for community’s 
improvement. On the other hand, integrative theory is opponent of the notion that a 
company should incorporate its business into the social needs and to integrate social 
demands into their business because in this way, it will be developed an interrelated 
relationship between the success of society and company.  A respectable number of 
earlier studies depends on this opinion (Carroll 1979; Wood 1991; Swanson 1995; Agle 
and Mitchell 1999).  
 
At this point, we should be referred to ‘instrumental theories’, like the one 
Friedman (1970) has developed and after its publication, many academics responded 
to his view in a positive way. In specific, Friedman was proponent of the thought that 
managers have the responsibility to increase company’s welfare and by extension 
stakeholders’. According to this theory, any CSR activity that is going to raise profits is 
acceptable. (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Mackey et al. 2007). 
 
Taking into consideration the above theories – opinions, we have ended to the 
following hypothesis, which supports the fact that a CSR company has a negative 
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association with earning management. While previously, we focused on the social 
impact of CSR on earnings management, there are also other important reasons which 
explain this negative association. In specific, the company’s reputation is one of the 
main reasons together with firm’s profitability. CSR operates as an indicator 
concerning the reputation of an entreprise (e.g., Fombrun and Shanley 1990). This 
notion prevents managers from involving in improper activities.  
 
Considering all these, there is also the opposite opinion, which supports that 
CSR has a positive association with earnings management. Numerical studies (e.g., 
Waddock and Graves 1997; Roman et al. 1999) indicate a positive association between 
CSR and financial performance. They supported that managers by interconnecting 
with CSR might pursue their personal interests than these of firms’ or of stakeholders’. 
One of the most known theories, the one that CSR is aligned with company’s targets 
(McWilliams et al. 2006), indicates that CSR has become an essential part of business’ 
strategies, so it should be denoted as an investment which will strengthen its 
reputation. Taking this theory a little further, according to Hemingway and Maclagan 
(2004), firms adopt CSR in an effort to cover up any implication or firms’ misbehavior. 
From stakeholders’ perspective, they have the belief that the company’s reports are 
transparent, while simultaneously firm is connected with earnings management. 
 
This motivation is in accordance with the theory of Prior et al. (2008), who is 
proponent of the positive association between CSR and earnings management, 
because managers are tempted to misrepresent stakeholders regarding the welfare 
and the financial performance of the firm. 
3. RESEARCH MODEL 
 
In this part, I demonstrate the research model for this dissertation. It is 
composed of the sample, the variables’ definitions and clarification for the selection. 
 
14 
 
3.1. Sample choice 
 
 
The primary sample is composed of non – financial companies with stocks in 
the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) during 2012 (n = 205). We are going to analyze the 
five-year period 2011 to 2016, so the definite sample has been constructed as below:  
 
In order to end up to the final sample, companies from the Alternative Market 
and the banking sector are rejected because they are proved problematic to our 
measurements according to the relevant literature. Firms that belong to insurance 
market and brokerage sector are also not appropriate for our measurements along 
with companies with low dispersion (n=10). The companies that are going to be 
deleted from Athens Stock exchange (n=10) are excluded, as well as these which are 
under investigation (n=30) or temporarily not available (n=28). Finally, my purpose is 
to analyze firms with CSR, so the companies which are not active in this area are 
outside of my sample, too (n=58). Therefore, my eventual sample is relied on 69 non-
financial companies. 
 
All the necessary information regarding variables has been obtained from 
Amadeus Database and when needed from the companies’ websites and financial 
reports. Additionally, ASE’s website was used in order to gather data about Corporate 
Social Responsibility and their earnings management behavior. 
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Table 1: Sample Choice Criterion 
 
 
 
3.2. Measurement of CSR and variables 
 
In this part, we explain how we measure the main and the secondary control 
variables. Then it follows the presentation of our empirical models. 
3.3. Dependent Variable 
 
 
Earlier researches on earnings management (e.g., Jones 1991; Subramanyam 
1996; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Kothari et al. 2005) use discretionary accruals 
as proxies for the measurement of earnings management and quality of earnings. For 
this reason, we apply discretionary accruals as our first proxy for earnings 
management. According to the study of Kothari et al. (2005), return on assets (ROA) 
is included in order to monitor the effect of the efficiency of measured discretionary 
accruals. With a view to do this, we work with the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals, in our case (EIT), because earnings management can be associated with 
raises or concerning accruals (Warfield et al. 1995; Klein 2002). In the case that our 
outcome is in accordance with the transparent financial reporting (non-transparent 
financial reporting) theory, we anticipate a negative (otherwise positive) association 
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between Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management (absolute value 
of discretionary accruals). 
 
3.4. Control Variables 
 
 
According to earlier researches, control variables like the volume of the 
company, profits, debt, growth opportunities, main activity and liquidity can affect the 
company’s transparency of its financial reports. Our most important control variable 
in both scenarios is CSR_SCORE, which measures the level of corporate social 
responsibility inside each firm. SOLR, the solvency ratio, calculates firm’s ability to 
meet its debt and other liabilities and duties. This ratio shows whether a company has 
sufficient cash flow in order to correspond to these obligations. If it is low, it means 
that the company probably will fail to pay its debts. The ROA is measured as net 
income to total assets and in our case, we use profit and losses before tax presented 
in % percent. This ratio shows how successful a company is, concerning its total assets 
and generally its profits. (Chen et al, 2010). According to Tian and Estrin (2008) ROA 
measures more effectively profitability than the measurement of return on sales 
because the fact that the results are repeated will be more helpful to our analysis.  
 
Furthermore, other control variables synthesize our analysis, which are 
considered as explanatory and secondary variables. To begin with the variable 
REPRISK, which I use in order to recognize the level of corporate social responsibility 
of every firm. The REP RISK AG is a tool that is used by the companies to help them 
find and monitor risk regarding environmental, social and corporate governance 
issues because these factors could influence their reputation. Moreover, the variable 
CRIF_SCORE is included in our measurements, which give us information about the 
credit level of the firm and its ability to pay its loans, as well as keep records of a loan 
repayment. This variable is useful to our research because if this credit score is high it 
means that the company has to repay its loans and by extension, it is prone to earnings 
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management. SIZE is a proxy that help us define the size of the firm. Usually, the size 
is measured with the logarithm of a firm’s total assets or this of the market value of 
equity (Chen et al, 2010). In our study, we use the market capitalization to measure 
the size of each firm, which is close to market value of equity. The control variable MB 
depicts the market-to-book equity ratio is useful in our research because it gives us 
indicatives about the value of the company. Additionally, we use as a control variable 
the ENT_VALUE, which contains information about each enterprise value. As a last 
thing, dummies are included to control for year fixed effects in corporate social 
responsibility activities during the years 2011–2016. if the year drops within a 
particular year, the dummy takes the value of 1, alternatively is 0.  
3.5 Display of Models  
 
 
With a view to analyze the association between the corporate social 
responsibility and earnings management, in sequence with Kothari et al. (2005) and 
Jo and Kim (2007), we are going to use discretionary accruals . In specific, we are 
adapted to a model used by Kothari (2005) and make the estimations of 
discretionary accruals. In order to do that we take into account the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals, which help us calculate earnings management.  Earlier 
researches of Klein 2002 and Kim, et al. 2012 also help us to our analysis.  
 
Following earlier studies (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998; Chan et al. 2008), α cross-
sectional OLS model is run like equation (1) for every company with a view to 
estimate earnings management (EIT). 
 
 
(1) EITt = αi + β1CSR_SCOREi,t + β2ROAi,t + β3SOLRi,t + β4REPRISKi,t 
+ β5CRIF_SCOREi,t + β6MBi,t + β7ENT_VALUEi,t + εi,t 
Where:   
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EITt = absolute value of discretionary accruals where discretionary accruals are 
computed using the below modified Jones model including lagged ROA as a regressor;  
TAit / Ait-1 = α0 (1/ Ait-1) + α1 (ΔREVit - ΔRECit) / Ait-1 + α2 PPEit / Ait-1 + α3 ΙΒΤit-1 
/ Ait-1 + εit,  
*CSR_SCOREi,t = Trucost environmental score1 which shows how big is the company’s 
environmental damage which results from its business activities.  
ROAi,t = the return on the total assets (ROA) for firm i at year t, which is determined 
as net income divided by total assets .  
SOLRi,t  = the Solvency Ratio and is measured by net income plus depreciation divided 
by short – long term liabilities.  
REPRISKi,t = it shows the level of corporate social responsibility in every firm 
CRIF_SCOREi,t = give us indications about the credit level of the firm 
MBi,t = market-to-book equity ratio, measured as MVE/BVE, where BVE is the book 
ENT_VALUEi,t = it is the enterprise value of the company 
The regression of equation (1) produces some residuals, which calculates the 
discretionary accruals.  
i and t are the subscripts which symbolize firms and year accordingly; α stands 
for the constant term, β1 to β7 use is as slopes while ε is the error term of the model; 
EIT is the earnings management measure as stated above. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
* The score measures six factors: 1) greenhouse gases 2) water 3) waste 4) air pollutants 5) pollution of 
land and water 6) use of natural resources 
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Additionally, to analyze our alternative hypothesis and to measure the 
scenario of calculating firms’ size with the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity instead of MB and we run the coming supplementary regression model: 
 
(2) EITt = αi + β1CSR_SCOREi,t + β2ROAi,t + β3SOLRi,t + β4REPRISKi,t + 
β5CRIF_SCOREi,t + β6SIZEi,t + β7ENT_VALUEi,t + εi,t   
 
Where: 
It remains the same as (1) but in this scenario we replace the MBi,t with SIZEi,t . 
 
Then, our linear regressions are applied to panel data for the appropriate 
display of our data. Panel data applicate time series and cross-sectional components 
in order to contain information regarding time and space. This is very important 
because observations of various phenomena are included in panel data and they have 
been acquired during different time period for the same companies from which many 
benefits stem. In the first place, it makes it easy to investigate many and more 
complicated issues. We were not be able to manage this with time series or cross-
sectional separately. In the second place, it would be problematic, if we were in need 
of analyzing variables and their association, which changes continuously, applying 
series data or cross sectional data. The use of time series data demands the switching 
of data in order to get an acceptable sum of measurements and to be in the position 
to take care of critical hypothesis tests. In such a manner, we are able to strengthen 
our test results by using both cross-sectional and time series and having as a result the 
processing of information for large entities simultaneously. The fact that if we use only 
time series can be ‘produced’ multicollinearity is a problem that can be defeated by 
the combination of the two above mentioned methods, along with the decrease of 
losses, which occurs if data are processed solely. Moreover, bias can be avoided 
because we are responsible for the design of our model in an appropriately way having 
also as a result the deletion of the influence of specific forms of biased variables in 
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regression outcome. Taking all into account, it is reasonable to use panel data for 69 
companies within a six year period from 2011 to 2016. We are going to use the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method in order to carry out our analysis. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this part of our study, we present our results of the empirical analysis, which 
is composed of descriptive statistics, Pearson correlations and regression findings 
following the explanation of these. 
 
4.1 Empirical Analysis 
 
To begin with, the empirical analysis, we present below the explanatory 
statistics of our variables in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Short statement of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Number of observations: 254; Period : 2011-2016; CSR_SCORE it measures the level of corporate 
social responsibility inside the firm; ROA that is calculated as net income divided by total assets; 
SOLR, is the solvency ratio and it measures firm’s ability to meet its debt; REPRISK, it shows the 
level of corporate social responsibility in every firm; CRIF_SCORE which give us indications 
about the credit level of the firm; MB market-to-book equity ratio, measured as MVE/BVE, where 
BVE is the book value of equity; ENT_VALUE is the enterprise value of the company; SIZE, the 
market capitalization which depicts the size of the firm; 
 EIT 
CSR_ 
SCORE ROA SOLR REPRISK 
CRIF_ 
SCORE ENT_VALUE SIZE MB 
 Mean  0.008759  1.116189 -0.012292  3.375062  0.081889  55.07323  25131.72  14.96965 -0.002764 
 Median -0.021687  0.615000  0.004700  3.758350  0.000000  59.05000  4570.558  1.230000  0.004092 
 Maximum  0.862310  6.592000  4.834000  8.633800  2.400000  84.90000  407672.6  220.3630  0.601421 
 Minimum -0.112320  0.251000 -6.057500 -9.919500  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.882222 
 Std. Dev.  0.117292  1.298814  0.952124  3.305989  0.392704  19.16155  63647.35  38.23801  0.153967 
 Skewness  0.492021  0.260030 -0.095249 -0.098700  0.496497 -0.074685  0.409976  0.370068 -0.236693 
 Kurtosis  2.992042  1.039798  1.303150  0.452654  2.686535  0.295124  2.043452  1.734100  2.172847 
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The results of the Table 2 are analyzed further and it expresses that the mean 
value of the dependent variable (EIT) is 0.008759 while the standard deviation is 
0.117292. EIT fluctuates between -0.112320 and 0.862310. Regarding control 
variables, the mean and the standard deviation respectively, of the variable 
CSR_SCORE are 1.12 and 1.30 of ROA are -0.01 and 0.10. Moreover, the mean values 
and standard deviations of the rest control variables SOLR, REPRISK, CRIF_SCORE are 
3.37 and 3.31, 0.08 and 0.39 and 55.07 and 19.16, regarding ENT_VALUE are 25131.72 
and 63647.35, concerning SIZE are 14.97 and 38.24 and 0.003 and 0.15 are those of 
MB’s. Lastly, the control variables in the order that they have stated above fluctuate 
between 2.99 the highest and 0.29 is the lowest. 
 
The next phase of our study contains the evaluation of the correlation 
coefficients among the variables. Our data are displayed in the Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation 
 
Number of observations: 254; Period : 2011-2016; CSR_SCORE it measures the level of corporate 
social responsibility inside the firm; ROA that is calculated as net income divided by total assets; 
 EIT CSR_SCORE ROA SOLR REPRISK 
CRIF_ 
SCORE 
ENT_VAL
UE SIZE MB 
EIT  1.000      
 
    
CSR_SCORE -0.156  1.000        
 
   
ROA -0.010  0.014  1.000      
 
 
 
   
SOLR -0.051  0.159  0.377  1.000     
 
    
REPRISK -0.007 -0.125  0.066  0.005  1.000   
  
     
CRIF_ 
SCORE -0.022  0.159  0.644  0.413  0.088  1.000   
 
  
ENT_VALUE -0.053  0.031  0.045 -0.028  0.177  0.110  1.000    
SIZE -0.075  0.089  0.168  0.158  0.244  0.231  0.736  1.000   
MB  0.042  0.057  0.119  0.540  0.005  0.137 -0.018  0.014  1.000 
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SOLR, is the solvency ratio and it measures firm’s ability to meet its debt; REPRISK, it shows the 
level of corporate social responsibility in every firm; CRIF_SCORE which give us indications about 
the credit level of the firm; ENT_VALUE is the enterprise value of the company; SIZE, the market 
capitalization which depicts the size of the firm; MB market-to-book equity ratio, measured as 
MVE/BVE, where BVE is the book value of equity; 
 
The correlation coefficient among the variables in the model is presented in 
the table 3 above. Our correlation is in accordance with Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient. An analysis of table 3 indicates that the correlation coefficient between 
the main variables CSR_SCORE, ROA and SOLR is negative. Their impact is not the same 
because CSR_SCORE and SOLR (as we will conclude from the next tables) are 
statistically significant at the 5% level, while ROA is not statistically significant at the 
5% level.  As a result, regarding CSR_SCORE and SOLR, if there is a positive (negative) 
change in one variable by one unit will lead to a negative (positive) change of the other 
variable by 0.159 units. Regarding ROA and CSR_SCORE along with SOLR, there will be 
no impact because of ROA’s no significance. Additionally, concerning EIT and ROA the 
correlation coefficient equals to –0.01 which means that there is a negative 
association between the two variables. If we increase (decrease) the variable by one 
unit will have as a result the reduction (raise) of the other by 0.01 units. CSR_SCORE 
and ROA are positively correlated with a coefficient that is equal to 0.01. Like above, 
this means that when a positive (negative) change occurs in one of these variables and 
by one unit, a positive (negative) change will take place concerning the other variable 
by 0.01 units. Lastly, EIT is negatively related with the control variables SOLR, REPRISK, 
CRIF_SCORE, ENT_VALUE, SIZE except from MB variable. On the other hand, the 
dependent variable ROA is positive correlated with all the control variables, so a 
positive (negative) change by one unit in one of these variables will cause the 
corresponding positive (negative) change in the other. 
 
The third phase of our analysis presents the results of the regressions. Firstly, 
regression model (1), in which EIT is the dependent variable and CSR_SCORE is the 
explanatory variable in addition with all the other variables that we have mentioned 
many times before, is calculated. The estimation of the coefficients have been 
occurred with the ordinary least squares method (OLS) as established in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: OLS Regression Results Model (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: EIT 
  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic  
     
     
CSR_SCORE 0.013930  
-9.407640 
(0.0000)  
ROA -0.000787  
-0.138886 
(0.8897)  
SOLR -0.003313  
-4.171626 
(0.0000)  
REPRISK -0.006122  
-1.038841 
(0.0026)  
CRIF_SCORE 0.000242  
1.434924 
(0.1526)  
MB 0.072824  
5.676905 
(0.0000)  
ENT_VALUE -9.04E-08  
-1.774394 
(0.0002)  
C 0.178854  
2.675764 
(0.0080)  
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.602494   
     
     
     
Number of observations: 254; Period : 2011-2016; CSR_SCORE it measures the level of corporate 
social responsibility inside the firm; ROA that is calculated as net income divided by total assets; 
SOLR, is the solvency ratio and it measures firm’s ability to meet its debt; REPRISK, it shows the 
level of corporate social responsibility in every firm; CRIF_SCORE which give us indications about 
the credit level of the firm; MB market-to-book equity ratio, measured as MVE/BVE, where BVE 
is the book value of equity; ENT_VALUE is the enterprise value of the company 
 
 
As we can conclude from the table above variable CSR_SCORE and ROA have a 
coefficient of 0.013930 and -0.000787 respectively while their probability is 0.0000 
and 0.8897. Regarding the coefficient of the independent variable CSR_SCORE is 
statistically significant at the 5% level because the p-value of its coefficient is less than 
5% and its coefficient has positive value. Additionally, we can conclude that because 
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the Corporate Social Responsibility variable is statistically significant, the companies 
with CSR activities are certainly associated with earnings management. The fact that 
the coefficient is positive indicates that if we use the dependent variable EIT will prove 
us that firms who have added to their activities CSR are more prone to earnings 
management than these, which have low level of CSR ore even not at all. In the case 
that our coefficient would be negative proves that companies with CSR tend to have 
more earnings management incentives and by extension present their financial 
reports with less transparency in accordance with the EIT ‘mark’. In our analysis, the 
coefficient of CSR_SCORE is positive, as above-mentioned, and it resulted in the 
expectation that this variable will positively influence the dependent variable of our 
model. For this reason, if we increase (decrease) the main control variable CSR_SCORE 
will bring about an increase (decrease) to our dependent variable EIT. Moreover, we 
observe that the coefficients of the control variables CRIF_SCORE and MB have a 
positive value, they are 0.000242 and 0.072824 respectively, but MB is statistically 
significant at the 5% level because the p-value of its coefficient is 0.0000 less than 
0.05, having as a result the positive association with our dependent variable EIT. MB 
and EIT have a positive relationship. On the contrary, CRIF_SCORE is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This means that a possible change of its value will not cause 
any effect on the dependent variable EIT. In contrast with this, concerning the 
coefficient of the control variable CRIF_SCORE an alternation in its value will not have 
an impact on the dependent variable EIT. The same is true regarding ROA. On the 
other hand, because of having negative coefficients the variables SOLR, REPRISK and 
ENT_VALUE and they are also statistically significant at the 5% level, when an increase 
(decrease) occurs will have as a result the opposite to our dependent variable EIT. It is 
worth to mention that if we exclude the variables which are not statistically significant 
from our model and recalculate it, the level of statistically significance of the other 
variables will not remain the same. We can assume that there is an interior 
relationship between all the variables, which provides evidence for further research. 
As a last thing, we notice the price of R-squared is 0.602494or 60%, further analysis 
about this factor is followed into the next part. 
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We have come to the last part of our empirical analysis, which is composed of 
the calculation and analysis of the coefficients of model (2). This model is slightly 
different because we replace the variable MB with SIZE. Like before, the estimation of 
the coefficients have been occurred with the ordinary least squares method (OLS) as 
established in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: OLS Regression Results Model (2) 
Dependent Variable: EIT  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
    
    Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
    
CSR_SCORE 0.013917  
-8.49713 
(0.0000) 
ROA -0.001241  
-0.200104 
(0.8416) 
SOLR -0.001054  
 
 
-2.309283 
(0.0218) 
REPRISK -0.004128  
-1.972192 
(0.0497) 
CRIF_SCORE 0.000220  
1.207348 
(0.2285) 
ENT_VALUE -2.17E-08  
-1.004854 
(0.3160) 
SIZE -0.000158  
 
 
-3.532831 
(0.0005) 
C 0.117433  
 
1.772787 
(0.0775) 
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.601918 
         
Number of observations: 254; Period : 2011-2016; CSR_SCORE it measures the level of 
corporate social responsibility inside the firm; ROA that is calculated as net income divided by total 
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assets; SOLR, is the solvency ratio and it measures firm’s ability to meet its debt; REPRISK, it shows 
the level of corporate social responsibility in every firm; CRIF_SCORE which give us indications 
about the credit level of the firm; ENT_VALUE is the enterprise value of the company; SIZE, the 
market capitalization which depicts the size of the firm; 
 
As we can conclude from the Table 5 above, the coefficient of the control 
variable CSR_SCORE is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, which mean 
that there is a positive association between CSR_SCORE and EIT, like the results of the 
first regression and this fact validates the model. Moreover, in this model, the variable 
SIZE has a negative coefficient, while in model (1) MB had the opposite. It is also 
statistically significant at the 5% level and this indicates that there is a negative 
association with EIT. The other variables ROA, SOLR, REPRISK and ENT_VALUE act like 
in the previous model (1). What is valid for the one variable is also valid for the other. 
However, we should stress that the control variables SOLR and REPRISK, because of 
their statistically significance, influence positively or negatively our dependent 
variable EIT and for this reason they are very important for our model. Finally yet 
importantly, the price of R-squared has slightly changed in comparison with the model 
(1). It’s price is 0.601918 or 60% and the low levels of R-squared indicate that the 
security is not acting like the other shares.  
4.2. Interpretation of Results 
 
 
To start with the results of table 2, the mean value of the CSR_SCORE is 
1.116189. This indicates that 111% of a rare Greek listed company has probably CSR 
activities, which is a big percentage. The EIT mean is 0.008759, which means that 0,8% 
of the companies have earnings management when they operate CSR activities. 
Regarding the control variable ROA, 1% of a Greek listed firm is non-profitable when 
it operates CSR activities. Additionally, we have noticed that some companies for 
specific years have EIT=0. This happened because this specific period companies had 
not any profits. The aforementioned data demonstrate that CSR companies and 
earnings management have a positive association but CSR is not vastly known in Greek 
listed firms.   
27 
 
The analysis of Table 3 indicates that there are some meaningful correlations 
between the variables. In specific, the correlation coefficient between the 
independent variable CSR_SCORE and the dependent variable EIT is -0.156, implying 
that a 1% increase in a firm’s CSR score will cause an -0.156 decrease in the EIT which 
shows that earnings management raises. As a result, this means that CSR companies 
presented to have more financial transparency while their CSR score is low. On the 
other hand, a positive correlation in MB and EIT (0.042) shows that as the company’s 
size is growing its EIT increases by 1%, the earnings management increases by 4%. 
Moreover, CSR_SCORE is positively correlated with ROA, SOLR, CRIF_SCORE, 
ENT_VALUE and SIZE variable which implies that a 1% increase in these variables could 
generate the corresponding (depending on the correlation coefficient of each 
variable) increase in the level of CSR activities. Lastly, we should be referred to the fact 
that as far as the correlation coefficients are, in general, below the 0.9 threshold, there 
will be no serious statistical consequences concerning multicollinearity. 
 
  Regarding table 4, analyzing the outcome we can observe that the variable 
CSR_SCORE has coefficient 0.013930 and probability of 0.0000, which means that it is 
statistically significant. The fact that the coefficient of the independent variable 
CSR_SCORE is positive shows that as much as the Corporate Social Responsibility is 
being established in a Greek firm, the more possible is the company to have earnings 
management. Our findings are not in accordance with these of Kim et. Al. (2012), 
because their research ended up that socially responsible firms do not manage their 
earnings. Nonetheless, this analysis concerns a U.S. sample. There are two potential 
reasons why is happening that. First of all, Greece has not manage to control the 
companies in a strict way, so many firms can avoid the transparent reporting of their 
financial results. Secondly, CSR is a new issue for Greek companies. The majority of 
them, as we stated in the introduction, imitate global companies and this results to an 
ignorance in the way they could reflect their profits in an appropriate manner. The 
same is true for MR variable, too. With regards to the probabilities of ROA and 
CRIF_SCORE variables, we can understand that they are not statistically significant, 
which means that there is not any change in the earnings management of Greek firms. 
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Lastly, the coefficients SOLR, REPRISK and ENT_VALUE are negative and statistically 
significant, so the higher they are the less prone to earnings management. Lastly R-
squared has a value of 0.602494 or 60%, which is high. Generally, if this indicator is 
high, the data are more suitable for our model.  
 
Referring to the Table 5, it consists of the conclusions of the model (2), which 
in addition analyzes the hypothesis between the previous variables but instead of MB 
we use the SIZE variable. As we noticed from the table, the coefficient of control 
variable CSR_SCORE is positive, the same with the model (1) and in both cases is 
statistically significant at 5%. In specific, it is witnessed again a positive relationship 
between the two variables (CSR_SCORE and EIT). Additionally, SIZE has coefficient -
0.000158 and probability 0.0005. As a result, its coefficient has negative sign and is 
statistically significant. Considering all these facts, we can conclude that the higher the 
SIZE, the lower earnings management. Meaning that the bigger the company, the less 
the possibility of having earnings management. Our results are contradictory with our 
first hypothesis regarding the size of the firm and the results of Prior et al. (2008) 
which are in favor of a negative association between CSR and earnings management. 
Regarding to the variables SOLR and REPRISK we can conclude that they have a 
negative coefficient and they are statistically significant at 5%. More specifically, it 
means that when these two elements increase the CSR_SCORE declines due to the 
negative coefficient together with the earnings management.  
 
Conclusive, in model (1), CSR_SCORE and MB variable influence in a positive 
way the EIT and consequently the earnings management. In model (2) the CSR_SCORE 
has still a positive coefficient but SIZE which is the replacement of MB a negative one, 
but still they are statistically significant at 5%, which means that they have a strong 
association with the dependent variable but SIZE influences earnings management in 
the opposite way. Last but not least, R-squared of the second model is 0.601918 (60%), 
really close to model’s (1). This indicates that all the mean variables will be a little 
lower than they are in model (1). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study targets to the analysis of the association between CSR and 
Earnings Managements in Greek listed firms. Additionally, we measured how deep 
influenced will be earnings management in comparison with the size of the firm. 
Applying to an extensive sample of Greek listed firms, we used two different 
models, which are slightly different, in the first case (model 1) we found out that 
there is a positive association between earnings managements and CSR practices. 
This association also depends on the book value of equity. Additionally, we have 
made a comparison with other components like the ROA ratio, the Solvency Ratio, 
the credit level of the firm or the level of these CSR activities, discovering that if we 
add these, the outcome will be different. Model (2) indicates that there is also a 
positive association between CSR and earnings management. These results stem 
from the fact that we preferred to hold stable all the variables and replace MB with 
SIZE variable. This model also gives us a proof that earnings management and 
Corporate Social Responsibility are positively correlated. Certain variables improve 
the transparency of financial reporting leading to the positive impact of CSR on 
earnings management. 
 
Our research adds value to the existing literature about the nature of this 
association because it takes place at a local setting, namely Greece. Our results 
might be applicable to countries, which are in an early phase, concerning the 
adaption of CSR in their strategies and similar financial entities like Greece’s has. 
This kind of relationship varies across companies with different strategies, size, 
financial situation and administration. Evidences also have been provided 
regarding the specific CSR element that plays a major role to the association 
between CSR and earnings management.  
 
Nonetheless, our study is subject to many limitations. The first one, is the 
fact that it relies in a small sample, because we examine a small country but the 
main reason is that many companies are not listed in Athens Stock Exchange or have 
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been excluded from our sample due to lack of CSR activities. As far as the global 
economic crisis is concerned, specifically in Greece, during the years (2011-2016) 
which we examine, there are many companies which have been delisted or their 
shares are under momentary suspension or even surveillance. Additionally, our 
model (1) & (2) composed of control variables, which have been used before in many 
alike studies. Despite all these facts, we are sure that there is a quite big number of 
substitutes or alternatives, which would be worthy to analyze. Taking into 
consideration different variables, we would be able to draw various conclusions 
regarding CSR and how it influences earnings management and in what extent. 
Moreover, an additional limitation is that we chose as a second model (2) to replace 
MB with SIZE variable and we did not try any extreme changes. If we examined more 
dependent variables or other more extreme cases, we could be in a better position 
to come to a more definite conclusion.. In addition, the combination of different 
control variables in our models results in the mixing results, which provide ‘roads’ 
for further investigation. Coming researches should test a bigger number of years 
and be able to use a broader sample regarding size as well as content. Lastly, future 
studies should consider other aspects of CSR practices, which influence the financial 
reporting and the way these financial reports are presented depending on the 
nature of the company or the substance of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
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Appendix A 
 
Calculation of Earnings Management proxies 
 
Discretionary Accruals 
 
  In accordance with DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), as well as Kothari et al. 
(2005), we run the cross-sectional regression model in an annual basis, having as a 
result residuals, which are every firm’s discretionary accruals. In order to improve 
the accuracy of our results, we also included ROAt-1 in the converted Jones model. 
Particularly, we calculate the below regression: 
 
TAit / Ait-1 = α0 (1/ Ait-1) + α1 (ΔREVit - ΔRECit) / Ait-1 + α2 PPEit / Ait-1 + α3 ΙΒΤit-1 / Ait-1 + εit,  
 
Where: 
 
TAit = total accruals for a firm i at year t; 
ΔREVit = change in net revenues in year t from year t-1; 
ΔRECit = change in net receivables; 
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PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment; 
IBΤit-1 = income before tax at year t-1; and 
Ait-1 = lagged total assets. 
 
Appendix B 
Definition of variables 
 
   
Variable Definition
EIT
absolute value of discretionary accruals where
discretionary accruals are computed using the 
modified Jones model including
CSR_SCORE
it measures the level of corporate social 
responsibility inside the firm
CRIF_SCORE give us indications about the credit level of the firm
SIZE
the market capitalization which depicts the size of 
the firm
REPRISK_CURRCPYRRI
it shows the level of corporate social responsibility in 
every firm
ROA it is measured as net income divided by total assets
SOLR
is the solvency ratio and measures firm’s ability to 
meet its debt
MB
market-to-book equity ratio, measured as MVE/BVE, 
where BVE is the book
value of equity
ENT_VALUE it is the enterprise value of the company
SIZE the natural logarithm of the market value of equity
Variables Definition
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